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THE ILLIBERALIZATION OF AMERICAN 
ELECTION LAW:  A STUDY IN DEMOCRATIC 
DECONSOLIDATION 
James A. Gardner* 
 
For many years, the dominant view among American election law scholars 
has been that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of 
democratic practice got off to a promising start during the mid-twentieth 
century but has since then slowly deteriorated into incoherence.  In light of 
the United States’ recent turn toward populist authoritarianism, that view 
needs to be substantially revised.  With the benefit of hindsight, it now 
appears that the Supreme Court has functioned, in its management of the 
constitutional jurisprudence of democracy, as a vector of infection—a kind 
of super-spreader of populist authoritarianism. 
There is, sadly, nothing unusual these days about an apex court 
reinterpreting a formerly liberal constitutional jurisprudence to support a 
populist authoritarian regime.  Typically, however, constitutional courts 
pivot toward authoritarianism suddenly, after they have been captured 
through aggressive court-packing or coercive threats and intimidation.  In 
the United States, however, federal courts retain real independence, and the 
process of illiberalization has been correspondingly slower and less 
immediate.  In particular, the Supreme Court has slowly illiberalized 
American election law in a two-stage process:  first, by deconsolidating a 
liberal jurisprudence into incoherence and then by reconsolidating it into a 
form more conducive to authoritarianism.  The main strategy by which this 
has occurred has been an increasingly aggressive deployment of an 
ever-narrower palette of individual rights, gradually narrowing a complex 
and conceptually rich jurisprudence to a single dimension—a judicial 
strategy that, in its radical anti-pluralism, is deeply populist, fundamentally 
illiberal, and profoundly destructive of the inherited liberal democratic 
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INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes we don’t fully understand where we’re headed until we arrive.  
In those moments, gazing back along the route we’ve traveled, things can 
look very different from how they appeared during the journey. 
For many years, the dominant view among American election law scholars 
has been that the U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence of 
democratic practice got off to a promising start during the mid-twentieth 
century but has, over the last several decades, slowly deteriorated into 
incoherence.  There it has remained, festering, unable to perform 
competently the minimal tasks that a democratic people demands from its 
own basic constitutional framework.  Most scholars even agree on the cause:  
a disastrous methodological choice by the Supreme Court to look to 
individual rights rather than constitutional structure as the principal—indeed, 
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the virtually exclusive—source of constitutional guidance on questions of 
democratic practice.1 
That view, I will argue here, was not wrong when it emerged, but in light 
of recent events it must be substantially revised, for it was the view of the 
traveler, a snapshot taken en route, when we still did not know where we 
were headed.  Now we know.  For nearly a quarter of a millennium, what 
Americans thought they knew about themselves is that the United States was 
a liberal republic founded on the principle of popular self-rule2 and that its 
history has unfolded, if not in one long, steady march toward a perfected 
democracy, at least along a serpentine path leading in that general direction,3 
guided by a broad societal consensus that a perfected democracy was our 
final destination as a people.  In 2016, Americans tore themselves from that 
dream by electing to the presidency, for the first time, a populist 
authoritarian4 who, with the full support of one of the two major national 
parties,5 waged a four-year war not only on democracy but also on the 
philosophical liberalism on which it rests. 
From this vantage point, things look very different, and my goal here is to 
retell the story of American election law in a way informed by an 
understanding only recently made possible by the unwelcome realization, 
afforded with the benefit of hindsight, that right-wing populist 
authoritarianism may long have been our at least partially unwitting 
destination.  In this story, the Supreme Court has not been a naive or heedless 
producer of doctrinal incoherence.  On the contrary, it is now clear that the 
Supreme Court has functioned, in its management of the constitutional 
jurisprudence of democracy, as a vector of infection, a kind of super-spreader 
of the conditions in which populist authoritarianism may take root and thrive. 
What makes this story unusual is not, however, that an apex court has 
moved to replace a formerly liberal constitutional jurisprudence with one 
more congenial to populist authoritarianism.  Sadly, democratic backsliding 
has become so commonplace around the world in the last decade that this is 
exactly what has occurred in many regimes.6  Typically, however, 
constitutional courts pivot toward authoritarianism only after they have been 
captured by a newly installed authoritarian regime—most often following 
aggressive deployment of policies to replace incumbent judges, pack the 
court with new appointees, or coerce favorable rulings through threats and 
 
 1. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 2. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA:  AN 
INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (1955). 
 3. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE:  THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES xvii–xviii, xx (2000). 
 4. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 2 (2018); PIPPA 
NORRIS & RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL BACKLASH:  TRUMP, BREXIT, AND AUTHORITARIAN 
POPULISM 245–46 (2019). 
 5. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 4, at 69, 70, 201. 
 6. See generally David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Abusive Judicial Review:  Courts 
Against Democracy, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1313 (2020). 
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intimidation.7  The hallmark of this kind of jurisprudential pivot is the 
suddenness with which it occurs. 
Conditions in the United States, however, are different.  Even today, 
federal courts retain real independence, reinforced by powerful norms of 
judicial branch autonomy, the ready availability of a robust veto tool, and a 
long history of willingness to use it in self-defense.8  As a result, the 
illiberalization of American election law has not occurred according to the 
emerging template.  It has instead occurred much more slowly and has been 
driven largely by the Supreme Court itself rather than by a powerful, 
authoritarian chief executive demanding judicial fealty.  As a result, the 
jurisprudence has evolved incrementally in roughly two major stages.  In the 
first stage, the Court took a robust liberal jurisprudence of democracy and 
deconsolidated it, rendering it, as so many scholars have observed, 
incoherent.  In hindsight, however, we can now see that incoherence was not 
a destination but merely a temporary waypoint, for it was followed closely 
by a second stage of jurisprudential development in which the Court began 
to reconsolidate the constitutional jurisprudence of democracy along illiberal 
lines.9 
The Court’s main strategy throughout this process has been simple and 
consistent:  it has pressed, with increasing aggressiveness, an ever-narrower 
palette of constitutional rules, to the point where a constitution initially 
well-stocked with provisions and principles relating to democratic practice 
was gradually remade by the Court into one that is textually bare and 
conceptually impoverished.  Today, the Court has reached the point where it 
typically views only one provision in the entire Constitution—the First 
Amendment, seven words out of thousands—as relevant to the resolution of 
constitutional issues of democratic self-governance. 
Political theorists agree that the defining characteristic of modern 
populism is its deep aversion to political pluralism,10 and in this sense, the 
Court’s strategy has been straight out of the populist playbook.  By gradually 
stripping the Constitution’s rich, multidimensional conception of democracy 
 
 7. See id. at 1338–45.  See generally David Kosař & Katarína Šipulová, How to Fight 
Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133 (2020). 
 8. This is seen, for example, in the decisive rejections by federal courts of Trump 
campaign challenges to results of the 2020 presidential election. See Rosalind S. Helderman 
& Elise Viebeck, “The Last Wall”:  How Dozens of Judges Across the Political Spectrum 




 9. In proposing a two-stage process, my analysis has much in common with that of 
Landau’s Populist Constitutions, except Landau deals with the more common situation in 
which a liberal constitution is deconsolidated and then reconsolidated primarily by textual 
amendment and replacement. See David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 
521 (2018).  Here, the process I describe involves almost exclusively an apex court’s 
superintendence of a constitutional document, the text of which remains stable. 
 10. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 25 (2016); NADIA URBINATI, ME THE 
PEOPLE:  HOW POPULISM TRANSFORMS DEMOCRACY 91 (2019).  See generally WILLIAM A. 
GALSTON, ANTI-PLURALISM:  THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018). 
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down to a single concept—freedom of speech—the Court has shaped a 
jurisprudence that is much more than merely incoherent.  It has become 
populist, pro-authoritarian, and hostile to liberal democracy; it has become a 
kind of anti-election jurisprudence that is fundamentally illiberal and deeply 
destructive of the inherited liberal settlement of the late twentieth century.  
The problem, in other words, is not the Court’s incoherence; it is the Court’s 
illiberalism. 
This Article will make good on these claims in the following way.  Part I 
provides a brief introduction to the problem that has long concerned scholars 
of election law:  the slow descent of the constitutional jurisprudence of 
democracy into incoherence.  Part II offers a quick review of global trends 
and patterns of democratic backsliding in liberal democracies, focusing on 
the role of courts.  Part III carefully traces the arc of the Supreme Court’s 
election jurisprudence, showing its evolution from liberalism to a 
deconsolidated incoherence to what is, at present, a slowly consolidating 
illiberalism. 
I.  THE VIEW FROM THERE:  THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DRIFT INTO 
INCOHERENCE 
After 170 years of near dormancy, the issue of constitutional management 
of democracy burst into the public consciousness in the 1960s following a 
series of Supreme Court decisions that profoundly altered the way Americans 
practice democratic self-governance.  In the space of a single decade, the 
Court invoked the U.S. Constitution to invalidate long-standing practices of 
racial gerrymandering11 and malapportionment of election districts at the 
federal,12 state,13 and local levels.14  It decimated time-honored voter 
eligibility requirements based on residency,15 duration of residency,16 
payment of poll taxes,17 and property ownership.18  It struck down obstacles 
to electoral candidacy, invalidating state-imposed ballot access requirements 
relating to signatures,19 filing fees,20 and possession of property.21  It tore 
through restrictions on the way campaigns are conducted, upending bans on 
election day campaigning22 and restrictions on criticism of incumbent public 
 
 11. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347–48 (1960). 
 12. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1964). 
 13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964). 
 14. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 497 (1968).  The Court also went on to 
invalidate malapportionment in many kinds of special districts. See, e.g., Hadley v. Junior 
Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 58–59 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705–06 
(1969). 
 15. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965). 
 16. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972). 
 17. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 18. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 622, 633 (1969). 
 19. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 60–61 (1968). 
 20. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718–19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 
(1972). 
 21. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970). 
 22. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966). 
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officials.23  And it decisively upheld the single most significant congressional 
intervention in the history of American civil rights,24 the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 (VRA), which itself set aside well-established principles of 
federalism by subordinating state electoral practices to direct federal 
oversight.25 
During this run, the Court began to build and deploy a rich and deeply 
liberal constitutional jurisprudence of democratic practice that dismantled 
long-standing barriers to participation by the politically marginalized, 
including Black people, city residents, the poor, and political dissenters.26  In 
so doing, it smashed and discarded old practices, holding out to the American 
public the possibility of new regulatory regimes that promised not just 
electoral fairness, but the systematic, mindful pursuit of democratic goals in 
place of reflexive obedience to inherited practice and passive acquiescence 
in long-standing power structures. 
Then things got weird. 
After a decade of breaking down barriers to participation by the politically 
weak, the Court began to apply the same aggressive skepticism to regulatory 
measures meant to prevent domination of the political process by the 
powerful.  In Buckley v. Valeo,27 a controversial 1976 ruling,28 the Court 
started down this path by holding not only that the Constitution does not 
implicitly contain, or even look favorably upon, any principle of equality of 
political influence among citizens, but that it is in fact actively opposed to 
such a principle, even as an ideal.29  The Court used this holding as the 
launching pad for a forty-year march through measures attempting to control 
political spending, during which it invalidated regulatory caps on total 
campaign spending by candidates;30 contributions by rich candidates to their 
own campaigns;31 and independent campaign expenditures by private 
individuals,32 political parties,33 political committees,34 advocacy 
organizations,35 and, in its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC,36 for-profit 
corporations.37 
 
 23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 24. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
 25. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 52 
U.S.C.). 
 26. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
 27. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 28. For an overview of critiques of Buckley, see JAMES A. GARDNER & GUY-URIEL 
CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 759–66 (2d ed. 2018). 
 29. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. 
 30. Id. at 54–59. 
 31. Id. at 51–54. 
 32. Id. at 39–51. 
 33. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican I), 518 U.S. 
604, 624–26 (1996). 
 34. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Pol. Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01 (1985). 
 35. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–65 (1986). 
 36. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 365. 
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The Court also began to decide cases in ways that produced bizarre and 
inexplicable outcomes.  It held, for example, that the Constitution prohibits 
limitations on political spending but permits restrictions on political 
contributions,38 thereby creating a system of campaign finance in which the 
demand for political money is unlimited and insatiable, but the supply of it 
is highly constrained—a recipe for cheating and corruption.39  In the field of 
political parties, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits the partisan 
blanket primary,40 a measure adopted by several states for the seemingly 
uncontroversial purpose of producing more moderate candidates in an era of 
increasing partisan polarization.  In the area of judicial elections, it ruled that 
the Constitution prohibits regulatory restrictions on the grounds upon, and 
the methods by which, judicial candidates may campaign for elective 
judgeships,41 obliterating a long-standing distinction between the nature of 
campaigns for judicial and legislative offices.  This change all but forced 
previously civil campaigns for elective judgeships into the pattern of bitter 
partisanship and high spending normally associated with legislative 
campaigns.42 
Despite having affirmed the constitutionality of public financing of 
elections,43 the Court nevertheless invalidated measures providing 
supplemental public funding to poor candidates who face rich, self-financed 
ones on the ground that such measures “penalize” the rich by unfairly 
eliminating their resource advantage.44  In Shelby County v. Holder,45 the 
Court gutted on constitutional grounds the preclearance provisions of the 
VRA,46 the centerpiece of the most successful civil rights statute in American 
history.  In McCutcheon v. FEC47 and McDonnell v. United States,48 the 
Court held that the Constitution embodies a definition of political corruption 
so narrow as to preclude regulation of virtually any political transaction 
except the most blatant exchanges of cash for power.49  At the same time, the 
Court failed in four tries to develop and apply a constitutional standard to 
restrain one of the most pressing political problems of our time, the 
 
 38. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976) (per curiam). 
 39. See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance 
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1710–11 (1999). 
 40. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585–86 (2000). 
 41. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002). 
 42. See Money in Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., 
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/strengthen-our-courts/promote-fair-courts/money-
judicial-elections [https://perma.cc/N4ZG-TPR4] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
 43. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85–108. 
 44. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 742, 754–55 
(2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 740 (2008). 
 45. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 46. Id. at 556–57. 
 47. 572 U.S. 185 (2014). 
 48. 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 49. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73, 2375; McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 207–10, 227. 
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increasingly aggressive practice of partisan gerrymandering,50 and in Rucho 
v. Common Cause,51 abandoned the effort altogether.52  And perhaps most 
significantly of all, the Court in Bush v. Gore53 ordered a halt to ballot 
recounts in the 2000 presidential election, an action that was widely, if in 
retrospect not entirely accurately,54 believed at the time to have thrown the 
presidential race to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush. 
What to make of all this?  It is, of course, the stock-in-trade of scholars to 
criticize, yet scholarly critique of the Court’s election law jurisprudence has 
gone well beyond professionally routine criticism of particular decisions or 
doctrines.  In fact, there is scarcely an election law scholar working today 
who has not at some point declared the Court’s entire body of election law 
decisions to be literally “incoherent,”55 or even, for lack of a more potent 
adjective, “beyond incoheren[t],”56 to say nothing of “muddled,”57 a 
“doctrinal quagmire,”58 and “utterly at sea.”59 
 
 50. See, e.g., Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Davis v. 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 51. 139 S. Ct. 2514 (2019). 
 52. Id. 
 53. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
 54. Subsequent investigations suggest that completing the interrupted recount would not 
likely have changed the result. See Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Examining the Vote:  
The Overview; Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-
overview-study-disputed-florida-ballots-finds-justices-did-not.html [https://perma.cc/PP6A-
29SC]. 
 55. See, e.g., Albert W. Altschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutcheon, 
Citizens United, and Speechnow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 445 n.281 (2015); Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics:  Explanations and 
Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 349 (2007); Edward B. Foley, Election Law and the 
Roberts Court:  An Introduction, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 735–36, 742 (2007); Luis 
Fuentes-Rohwer & Laura Jane Durfee, Leaving the Thicket at Last?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
419, 421, 431–32; James A. Gardner, The Dignity of Voters–A Dissent, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
435, 440–41 (2010); Heather K. Gerken, The Right to Vote:  Is the Amendment Game Worth 
the Candle?, 23 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 11, 24 (2014); Joel Gora, The First 
Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. L. REV. 935, 980 (2011); Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is 
Dead, Long Live Buckley:  The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal 
Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32–33 (2004); Pamela S. Karlan, New 
Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 761 (2007); Daniel 
R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 682 (2012); Lori Ringhand, Defining 
Democracy:  The Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 80 
(2004); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, Discrimination and Democracy:  Parents Involved’s 
Disregard for Process, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 848 (2008).  As long as a decade ago, Professor 
Tokaji described “[t]he incoherence of the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence” as “a 
recurring theme” of an entire symposium. Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It to the Lower Courts:  On 
Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065, 1065 (2007). 
 56. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence:  The Roberts Court’s 
Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2008). 
 57. Michael S. Kang, When Courts Won’t Make Law:  Partisan Gerrymandering and a 
Structural Approach to the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1097 (2007). 
 58. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?:  Judicial Review 
of Political Gerrymanders, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 574 (2004). 
 59. Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601, 604 
(2007). 
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This conclusion was, at the time, difficult to resist, and logically raised the 
question of what might account for the Court’s slow and alarming drift into 
incoherence in a domain of constitutional law that, perhaps more than any 
other, ought to enjoy clarity and stability.  For two decades, the prevailing 
scholarly consensus was, and remains, that the roots of the Court’s difficulty 
lie in a methodological choice.  The U.S. Constitution contains many 
provisions that establish and regulate processes of democratic self-rule.  
Some of these, like Article I, Section 2, which provides that the House of 
Representatives shall be “chosen every second Year by the People of the 
several States,” and sets minimum qualifications for representatives, are 
structural.60  Others, like the Equal Protection Clause and the First 
Amendment, establish judicially enforceable individual rights.61  The 
problem, scholars have generally contended, is that the constitutional 
jurisprudence of democracy developed by the Court increasingly is founded 
almost exclusively on individual rights and pays virtually no attention to 
foundational principles of representative democracy embedded in the 
Constitution’s structural provisions—a position that frames the so-called 
“rights-structure debate.”62 
But that was then.  Since this body of scholarly opinion emerged, much 
has become clear that was not clear at the time. 
II.  DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING 
Following the conclusion of World War II, and again after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, two successive waves of worldwide democratization so 
dramatically expanded the number of democracies in the world63 that it 
seemed to some as though liberal democracy64 were the culmination of some 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 61. Id. amends. I, XIV. 
 62. Among the many works that have either made or expressed sympathy for the structural 
critique of the Court’s rights-oriented election law jurisprudence are: Charles, supra note 59, 
at 649–70; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:  New Pressures 
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 644 (2008); 
Gardner, supra note 55, at 441–42; Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket:  The Court, 
Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 504 (2004); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:  Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal:  The 
Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 1345 (2001); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps:  Social Meanings, 
Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 727 (1998); Richard H. 
Pildes, Foreword:  The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 
40 (2004); Ringhand, supra note 55, at 87; Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices 
of Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1329–30 (1994). 
 63. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE:  DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 17 (1991); JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT:  THE 
REVOLT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 35, 49–64 (2013); LARRY DIAMOND, ILL WINDS:  SAVING DEMOCRACY FROM 
RUSSIAN RAGE, CHINESE AMBITION, AND AMERICAN COMPLACENCY 43–53 (2019). 
 64. See infra Part III for discussion of the term “liberalism” and its relation to 
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kind of “natural human evolution.”65  More recently, however, this trend has 
undergone an equally dramatic reversal.  The number of states becoming less 
democratic has climbed steadily over the last two decades to levels not seen 
since the late 1970s; almost 35 percent of the world’s population now lives 
in “autocratizing nations.”66  Moreover, even in many states that remain 
fundamentally democratic, the quality of democracy, as measured by the free 
enjoyment of civil liberties, the rule of law, and the integrity of democratic 
processes, has declined.67  In this process of “democratic backsliding,” 
long-standing, stable democracies have suffered slow, incremental 
degradation of previously reliable democratic institutions.68  According to 
Freedom House, for example, the number of “highly deficient democracies” 
around the world doubled between 2006 and 2010.69  In 2016, The 
Economist’s Democracy Index downgraded the United States to a “flawed 
democracy.”70 
The typical pattern by which democratic decline occurs also has changed 
dramatically from earlier periods.  During the twentieth century, 
authoritarian takeovers typically occurred by way of a military coup or naked 
electoral fraud on a massive scale.71  Today, in contrast, democratic 
backsliding most often follows an open democratic process in which an 
illiberal party wins power under reasonably fair rules of democratic 
competition before gradually entrenching itself in power through 
anti-democratic means.72 
This kind of incremental democratic backsliding has by now become 
sufficiently commonplace to allow comparativists to identify certain 
common patterns by which democratically elected authoritarian leaders 
gradually consolidate power and undermine liberal democratic institutions—
a kind of “authoritarian’s playbook.”73  The most typical strategy involves 
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 68. Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2016); TOM 
GINSBURG AND AZIZ HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43–47 (2018); 
DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 55. 
 69. KURLANTZICK, supra note 63, at 9. 
 70. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2016:   
REVENGE OF THE “DEPLORABLES” (2016), http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/ 
WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2016.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2016 [https://perma.cc/4HQL-K6A3]. 
 71. See Bermeo, supra note 68, at 6–7. 
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moving quickly to concentrate power in the executive,74 which in turn entails 
the systematic undermining of interbranch checks on executive power.75  
Where the structure of governance includes a constitutional court with the 
power of judicial review, this tactic requires undermining the independence 
of the court to the point that it becomes incapable of curbing abuses of 
government power.76 
In most cases of democratic backsliding, the tactics deployed to undermine 
judicial independence have been direct, aggressive, and initiated by an 
authoritarian executive, usually with the cooperation of a legislature 
controlled by the leader’s party.  These tactics include court-packing through 
manipulation of the size of the apex court; seizing control of the 
appointments process; or the use of credible, coercive threats against sitting 
judges.77  The hallmark of this kind of judicial capture—and, of course, its 
desired outcome—is a sudden alteration in the court’s jurisprudence in favor 
of results preferred by the regime.  As Professors David Landau and Rosalind 
Dixon explain, a captured apex court that had previously stood up to an 
authoritarian regime may suddenly adopt a posture of passivity and begin to 
uphold legislation or executive actions that undermine core principles of 
democratic self-governance, insulating the ruling regime from meaningful 
electoral competition.78  In more extreme cases, a captured court may begin 
on its own actively to devise and aggressively to apply new legal doctrine 
that advances the authoritarian regime’s agenda.79 
The characteristic evidence that such measures have successfully captured 
constitutional courts is a sudden shift in jurisprudence and legal reasoning—
the court’s methods and decisions are liberal until, suddenly and 
suspiciously, they are not.  Thus, in Bolivia, for example, in a 2015 decision, 
the Bolivian high court considered a constitutional provision limiting 
presidential terms to be a clear and valid restriction on the ability of President 
Evo Morales to continue in office.80  Following an aggressive program of 
court-packing, the court two years later reversed itself and, in an opinion 
riddled with dubious reasoning, invalidated the constitution’s presidential 
term limits as a violation of international human rights law.81 
In the United States, democratic backsliding in the executive and 
legislative branches of the national government has occurred more or less 
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according to the usual pattern.  Donald Trump, a populist authoritarian 
candidate,82 won the presidency in a fair and open contest, and the 
Republican Party, which in the wake of Trump’s victory now leans decisively 
toward right-wing populism,83 held and retained the Senate.  Following the 
authoritarian playbook, Trump, with the approval and support of Republicans 
in Congress,84 mounted a series of attacks on the foundations of the liberal 
democratic state by demonizing political opponents; attacking independent 
institutions like the press, the judiciary, and the federal civil service; praising 
and encouraging white supremacists; and lying constantly.  Trump ultimately 
attempted openly to undermine electoral democracy itself by denying his 
2020 electoral defeat, and then inciting a riot at the Capitol in the hope of 
disrupting the constitutionally prescribed process for concluding the 
presidential election.85 
On the judicial side, however, the story is more complicated.  To be sure, 
Republicans have long engaged in a highly deliberate campaign to control 
the judiciary including, on the state level, through overt court-packing.86  
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary is institutionally well-insulated from 
political pressure, and enjoys a tradition of significant judicial independence 
stretching all the way back to the founding era.87  Although conditions thus 
exist that would allow the U.S. Supreme Court to maintain itself as a bulwark 
against populist and authoritarian efforts to erode liberal democracy, it 
simply has not done so. 
However, again because of the Court’s independence, the illiberalization 
of American election law has proceeded along a path different from the one 
described above, a path that has been largely under the control of the Court 
and which it has followed in its own way, in its own time.  The process of 
illiberalization has thus been incremental, complex, and largely hidden from 
public view because it has occurred mainly through incremental changes in 
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constitutional doctrine, sometimes of a highly technical nature.88  This 
illiberalization has proceeded in two stages:  First, the Court deconsolidated 
an existing liberal constitutional jurisprudence of democracy into 
incoherence, creating the kind of chaos and confusion in which 
authoritarianism is known to thrive.89  Then, the Court began a slow process 
of reconsolidating the jurisprudence as illiberal and anti-democratic. 
III.  THE ARC OF ILLIBERALIZATION 
This part traces in detail the development over fifty years of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice to show its evolution from 
liberal to illiberal.  Before proceeding to this analysis, it is important to 
explain briefly what I mean by these terms. 
The meaning of “liberalism” has often been deeply contested, even by its 
own adherents.90  Nevertheless, contemporary writers generally agree on 
several core features of liberal thought.  Perhaps its most basic principle is 
popular sovereignty—the doctrine that the people of a society are entitled to 
rule themselves, rather than to be ruled by some leader whose claim to rule 
derives from either tradition or divine command.91  The idea of popular 
sovereignty is conventionally associated with other commitments upon 
which popular sovereignty rests, or which are essential to its success.  These 
include, for example, a commitment to the fundamental political equality of 
citizens;92 the requirement of a “lively civil society,”93 in which citizens 
enjoy the freedom necessary to develop their own ideas about the nature of 
the good life and how the polity ought best to pursue it; the “rule of law”;94 
and, typically, a package of basic human rights, such as the rights of free 
speech and free association, thought necessary to the effectuation of popular 
self-rule.95 
Illiberalism equally covers a great diversity of ground, but for present 
purposes, I will consider it simply as any body of political thought opposed 
to any of the foundational commitments of liberalism just described.  Thus, 
for example, a system would count as illiberal if it is premised on the 
inequality of citizens; if it denies the entitlement of the entire populace to rule 
itself through majority rule; if civil society is understood to be in fact not free 
 
 88. In this, it differs considerably from the burst of new electoral regulation law generated 
over the last few years by Republican-controlled state legislatures, which has been direct and 
overt in its anti-democratic aims.  For an overview, see Gardner, supra note 73, at 897–908, 
and sources cited therein. 
 89. See KAGAN, supra note 65, at 10. 
 90. See generally ROSENBLATT, supra note 65. 
 91. See generally ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA:  OR THE NATURAL POWER OF KINGS 
(1680) (the work that prompted John Locke to develop foundational conceptions of liberalism 
in his two treatises).  See also ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING:  A STUDY 
OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 242 (1964). 
 92. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 24. 
 93. See DIAMOND, supra note 63, at 19. 
 94. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 68, at 9 (emphasis omitted). 
 95. See id.; JUAN J. LINZ, TOTALITARIAN AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 20, 58 (2000). 
436 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
but structured irrevocably by higher laws of religious or traditional origin; 
and so forth. 
At this historical moment, however, the particular strain of illiberalism of 
greatest concern is “authoritarian populism.”96  Populists generally hold that 
a “true” people, inevitably narrower in scope than the entire population of the 
state, has lost its rightful control of the state to a corrupt minority.97  The 
solution requires a strong leader with a profound understanding of the true 
people’s needs,98 who will accomplish their objectives through the 
accumulation and deployment of immense power that ought not to be 
restrained by institutional or even democratic checks.99  Of particular 
concern here is that “populism is always anti-pluralist”;100 it denies the 
plurality of society’s members and their interests and beliefs, and thus offers 
“a phenomenology that involves replacing the whole with one of its parts.”101  
As a result, “because the people and the leader have effectively merged . . . 
the role of deliberation and mediation can be drastically reduced.”102 
While we normally associate populism with the representative branches of 
government—the legislature, and above all, the executive—populist 
behavior can also be found in the judicial branch.  As Professors Anya 
Bernstein and Glen Staszewski have persuasively demonstrated, populist 
judging has a distinctive style that, mirroring populist political beliefs, 
prefers simplicity over complexity; understands and employs “correct” forms 
of judging, uncorrupted by the influence of untrustworthy elites; and rejects 
any kind of interpretational or methodological pluralism.103  Commitments 
to textualism and originalism, they argue, exemplify the populist style of 
judging and, in their rejection of practical reasoning, are inherently illiberal 
and anti-democratic. 
A.  Beginnings:  Liberal and Plural 
1.  The Raw Material of the Constitutional Scheme 
The first and foremost function of a constitution is to create the state104 by 
establishing institutions, assigning powers,105 and in general “defin[ing] the 
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structure of the ‘normally’ functioning state.”106  Thus, even before they 
impose limits on official power, constitutions must “establish institutions that 
allow people to cooperate and coordinate to pursue projects that they cannot 
achieve on their own.”107  Consistent with this understanding, every 
constitution the world over devotes considerable attention to the basic 
structure and operation of the state, including the form of government, and 
where that form of government is democratic, to the basic practices of 
democratic self-governance.  As Professor Samuel Issacharoff has observed, 
modern constitutions “[a]lmost invariably . . . give express textual protection 
to democratic processes and to the institutions of democratic politics.”108 
The U.S. Constitution is no different.  At least a dozen provisions of the 
original document deal explicitly with the structure of democratic 
representation (a full inventory of constitutional provisions regulating 
democratic practice is provided in the Appendix).  Article I, Section 2, for 
example, establishes the system of democratic representation by which the 
House of Representatives is to be constituted,109 sets the qualifications for 
representatives, and specifies how representation in the House is to be 
allocated among the states.110  Article I, Section 4 authorizes states to 
regulate the time, place, and manner of elections for federal office, subject to 
a congressional override.111  Another provision prohibits the granting of titles 
of nobility.112  Several provisions establish mechanisms for selecting the 
president.113  Another provides that the United States “shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.”114 
Constitutional amendments have more than doubled the number of 
provisions addressing democratic practice.  These provisions revise the 
mechanisms for selecting presidents and for apportioning representation in 
the House, and extend democratic methods of selection to the U.S. Senate.115  
They create political rights of free speech, association, and equality;116 
drastically limit the grounds upon which citizens may be disfranchised;117 
and grant Congress new powers to police and enforce constitutionalized 
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constraints on democratic practice.118  Nearly thirty provisions, totaling 
roughly 1855 words—about one-quarter of the document119—are devoted to 
establishing and regulating the practice of representative democracy in the 
United States. 
This body of textual resources, moreover, is supplemented by a rich record 
of political thought by some of the most original and penetrating political 
thinkers that the United States has ever produced—a body of thought that 
many members of the Supreme Court consider themselves obliged to consult 
in constitutional cases.120  Standard reference documents, such as The 
Federalist Papers, Madison’s notes of the 1787 convention, Farrand’s notes 
of the state ratifying conventions, and the public speeches and private 
correspondence of the Framers and other prominent individuals of the 
founding period—to say nothing of the records associated with enactment of 
the Reconstruction Amendments and later amendments concerning voting—
run to many thousands of pages.121  In sum, there is no shortage of resources 
available to assist courts in giving meaning to America’s commitments to 
popular sovereignty and democratic self-governance. 
2.  The Founding Jurisprudence:  Pluralist and Liberal 
The Court initially inserted itself into the field of democratic elections in 
dramatic fashion.  In a pair of cases decided in 1964, Wesberry v. Sanders122 
and Reynolds v. Sims,123 it held that the method used by the states to draw 
congressional and state legislative districts was constitutionally defective, 
thus invalidating at a stroke, as Justice Harlan complained in dissent, “the 
composition of the House of Representatives”124 as well as that of “all but a 
few” state legislatures.125  That is, the Court’s rulings held unconstitutional 
the very makeup of legislative power throughout the length and breadth of 
the United States. 
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The Court’s methods and reasoning were, in both cases, eclectic, drawing 
on a great variety of the available interpretive resources and traditions of 
constitutional interpretation.  The majority in Wesberry rested its holding 
primarily on the language of Article I, Section 2—a structural provision—
which requires that congressional representatives be chosen “by the People 
of the several States.”126  But the Court drew meaning from this spare 
provision by resorting to other sources of constitutional meaning.127  It 
examined the deliberations and intentions of the Framers of the Constitution, 
devoting considerable attention to their understanding of the “rotten 
boroughs” of England and the historical circumstances of the Great 
Compromise.128  It drew on principles of equality, normally associated with 
the individual rights provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.129  It looked 
for guidance to other structural provisions such as Article I, Section 3 and 
Article V.130  Most importantly, the Court began to draw from the 
Constitution, though only insofar as necessary to decision in the case before 
it, a theory of representative democracy itself—a theory in which, consistent 
with the fundamental tenets of liberalism,131 all citizens are deemed equal in 
their entitlement to participate in whatever processes of governance the 
people collectively decide to adopt. 
The Court deployed the same approach even more forcefully a few months 
later in Reynolds.  There, it relied on many of its own precedents, which it 
read, collectively, to establish implicitly a constitutionally grounded right to 
vote.132  It invoked constitutional text in the form of the Equal Protection 
Clause.133  It read Wesberry as identifying a constitutionally embedded 
“fundamental principle of representative government,” which it described as 
“equal representation for equal numbers of people.”134  It brought in 
principles of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to help it locate 
the right to vote among “the basic civil rights of man.”135  It further 
elaborated its emerging theory of democratic representation by declaring 
unequivocally that “[l]egislators represent people, not trees or acres.  
Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic 
interests”136—a position that reads the Constitution as decisively opposed, 
down to its deepest conceptual roots, to malapportionment.  In addition, the 
Court adverted to the intentions of the Framers.137  It brought in simple 
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“logic[],” and reconstructed what it considered to be the “basic aim of 
legislative apportionment” to flesh out a constitutionally grounded 
conception of democratic representation.138  In short, the Court’s methods 
and approach, in the cases that essentially founded the field of constitutional 
election law, were deeply pluralistic and fundamentally liberal.139 
B.  Deconsolidation into Incoherence 
If the U.S. Constitution contains a potentially rich body of resources that 
might guide courts in the constitutional management of democratic practices, 
how has the Supreme Court actually proceeded?  As this section shows, the 
Court has slowly narrowed the provisions it considers relevant down to 
two—twelve words out of nearly two thousand140—as its virtually exclusive, 
all-purpose vehicles for adjudicating constitutional claims involving 
democratic practice.  The following section describes in some detail the 
Court’s present constitutional jurisprudence of democratic practice. 
1.  The Move to Rights:  Three Regimes 
The Court’s jurisprudence of democracy consists of three major rights 
regimes that the Court presently uses to adjudicate questions of democratic 
practice:  (1) a jurisprudence founded on the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Fifteenth Amendment to handle claims of racial discrimination; (2) a 
right-to-vote jurisprudence grounded in the Equal Protection Clause to 
handle certain claims of infringement or dilution of the right to vote; and (3) 
a comparatively newer, rapidly expanding, and increasingly comprehensive 
First Amendment jurisprudence of speech and association to handle most 
claims involving infringement of the right to vote as well as virtually all other 
claims relating to democratic process and procedure. 
a.  Regime 1:  Racial Discrimination 
Not surprisingly, the Court’s earliest interventions in the field of 
democratic practice were precipitated by incidents from the nation’s long, 
ugly history of racial discrimination in politics.  It was therefore inevitable 
that some of the earliest cases to reach the Court in the field of democratic 
process would involve egregious instances of naked, Jim Crow exclusion.  
Some cases, for example, raised constitutional challenges to state laws 
barring Black people from voting through means such as grandfather 
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clauses141 or prohibitions on Black participation in party primaries.142  Not 
surprisingly, the Court turned in such cases to the Constitution’s two direct 
prohibitions of racial discrimination—the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits racial discrimination generally, and 
the Fifteenth Amendment, which narrowly targets racial discrimination in 
voting.  Because these amendments offer specialized tools for a highly 
specific but recurring problem that cuts across every aspect of politics, the 
Court’s reliance on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was not 
merely reasonable, but obvious.  As the Court observed in Smith v. 
Allwright,143 “[i]t may now be taken as a postulate that the right to vote in . . . 
a primary [or] general election is a right secured by the Constitution [which] 
may not be abridged on account of race.”144 
In later years, the Court continued consistently to rely on the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments to adjudicate claims that laws regulating 
democratic practices and processes discriminated on the basis of race.  In the 
seminal, mid-twentieth-century case of Gomillion v. Lightfoot,145 for 
example, the Court turned to the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate an 
Alabama law that redrew the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee in a way 
that left every white resident inside the city and virtually every Black resident 
outside it.146  In White v. Regester147 and Mobile v. Bolden,148 the Court 
turned to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to adjudicate claims that 
the use of at-large elections discriminated against Black or Latinx people.  In 
a more recent series of cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno,149 the Court 
repeatedly invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to analyze claims that 
redistricting authorities had relied excessively on the race of voters when 
assigning them to election districts. 
Not all constitutional problems with the regulation of politics, however, 
arise from racial discrimination; in recent years, such claims have formed a 
distinct minority of election-related litigation.  Thus, the pertinent challenge 
from the point of view of contemporary constitutional law is increasingly 
how to handle claims involving democratic practices and processes that do 
not turn on issues of race.150  For those purposes, the Court has developed 
two additional regimes of rights enforcement. 
 
 141. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 277 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 347–
48 (1915). 
 142. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–65 
(1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927). 
 143. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
 144. Id. at 661–62. 
 145. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 146. Id. at 346–47. 
 147. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 148. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 149. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).  Shaw was followed by numerous similar cases including Easley 
v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Lawyer v. Dep’t 
of Just., 521 U.S. 567 (1997); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 
(1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 150. See, e.g., Case Tracker, ELECTION L. AT OH. ST. UNIV., https://electioncases.osu.edu/ 
case-tracker/?sortby=filing_date_desc&keywords=&status=all&state=all&topic=25 
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b.  Regime 2:  The Equal Protection-Based Right to Vote 
In cases falling outside the realm of racial discrimination, the Court’s 
approach for several decades consisted simply of extending the reach of the 
Equal Protection Clause to cover new classes of problems as they arose.  
Many of the earliest cases in this category involved state laws establishing 
qualifications for voting—literacy, payment of a poll tax, residency, and so 
forth—that had the effect of excluding the unqualified entirely from the 
franchise.151  Litigants accordingly challenged such laws on the ground that 
they interfered with a constitutionally grounded right to vote.  The Court 
agreed but, curiously, located the right to vote not in the provisions of the 
Constitution that speak explicitly of voting—provisions, for example, in 
Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment establishing an elected House of 
Representatives152 and Senate,153 respectively—but in the Equal Protection 
Clause, an awkward location that seems far from self-evidently the logical 
place for a right to vote. 
The Court’s difficulty in this enterprise, however, was self-created.  In its 
1874 decision in Minor v. Happersett,154 a pre-Nineteenth Amendment155 
case in which a female plaintiff challenged a state law restricting the 
franchise to males, the Court held that “the Constitution . . . does not confer 
the right of suffrage upon any one”156—that there is, in other words, no 
federally guaranteed constitutional right to vote.157  To permit it to evaluate 
the constitutionality of franchise restrictions without overruling this 
long-standing precedent, the Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause, 
reasoning that even though the Constitution does not require states to allow 
voting at all, or by anyone in particular, a state that does choose to create 
elections by extending the franchise must do so in a way that comports with 
the requirements of equal protection.158  The Court ultimately deployed this 
 
[https://perma.cc/F5WA-LQ9R] (Dec. 31, 2020) (listing major litigation associated with the 
2020 elections). 
 151. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (literacy test); 
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 
89 (1965) (residency). 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 153. Id. amend. XVII, § 1. 
 154. 88 U.S. 162 (1874). 
 155. The Nineteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination in voting “on account of sex.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 156. 88 U.S. at 178. 
 157. The Court’s conclusion was a consequence of Article I, Section 4 and Article II, 
Section 1, which allocate the authority to establish qualifications to vote in federal elections 
to the states.  For further explanation, see James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the 
Constitutional Structure of Political Influence:  A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 
U. PA. L. REV. 893, 961–62 (1997). 
 158. The Court expressed this most clearly in Harris v. McRae: 
Although the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right to vote in 
state elections . . . if a State adopts an electoral system, the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon a qualified voter a substantive right to 
participate in the electoral process equally with other qualified voters. 
448 U.S. 297, 322 n.25 (1980). 
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equal protection–based right to vote in a series of cases adjudicating the 
constitutionality of exclusions from the franchise based on literacy,159 
residency,160 payment of a poll tax,161 status as a property taxpayer,162 and 
length of residency in the jurisdiction.163 
The pattern pioneered in these voter exclusion cases was soon extended to 
other kinds of claims.  In one line of cases, the Court turned to the Equal 
Protection Clause and its embedded right to vote in cases involving 
allegations of vote “dilution” rather than exclusion.  Thus, in Reynolds v. 
Sims, the Court invoked the right to vote—a right it characterized as 
“individual and personal in nature”164—to invalidate malapportionment of 
state legislative districts on the ground that the right of voters in 
overpopulated districts was improperly diluted.  It has since applied the 
one-person, one-vote doctrine identified in Reynolds in many subsequent 
cases.165  In another line of cases, since repudiated, the Court extended its 
equal protection–based voting rights analysis to the adjudication of claims 
challenging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.166  In yet 
another line of cases, the Court applied the same right to vote in cases 
involving limitations on candidacy, including restrictions on the ability of 
candidates to get their names listed on the election ballot,167 age and property 
qualifications for holding office,168 and resign-to-run legislation that requires 
certain incumbents to resign their present office before running for 
another.169  Finally and most recently, the Court has applied the equal 
protection–based right to vote in cases involving election administration, 
most notably in Bush v. Gore,170 where it held that the right to vote is violated 
when some voters are subjected arbitrarily to substandard procedures for 
recounting ballots in a contested election.171 
 
 159. Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
 160. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75 (1978); Carrington v. Rash, 
380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965). 
 161. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
 162. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1969). 
 163. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 357–60 (1972). 
 164. 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). 
 165. Some cases have dealt with the range of permissible population variance. Brown v. 
Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983); Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315 (1973).  Other cases extended the Reynolds equal protection analysis to various 
species of special districts. Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Cipriano v. City 
of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 166. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 
(2004); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).  These cases were repudiated in Rucho, 
which held partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 
S. Ct. 2514 (2019). 
 167. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 795 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 
718–19 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 
149 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1968). 
 168. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1991) (upholding law requiring 
state judges to retire at age 70); Quinn v. Milsap, 491 U.S. 95, 109 (1989) (invalidating 
property qualification to serve on local government reorganization commission). 
 169. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 972–73 (1982). 
 170. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 171. Id. at 134–35. 
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In short, beginning roughly with its 1959 decision in Lassiter v. 
Northampton County Board of Elections,172 which upheld the use of literacy 
tests, and for several decades thereafter, the Court deployed the right to vote, 
a right it found embedded implicitly in the Equal Protection Clause, as its 
primary workhorse in democracy-related cases that did not involve charges 
of racial discrimination. 
The reign of equal protection ended abruptly, however, and it is possible 
to identify the date with some precision:  April 19, 1983.  That is the date on 
which the Court handed down Anderson v. Celebrezze,173 a case in which the 
Court refounded the right to vote in the First Amendment freedoms of speech 
and association,174 a change that has had enormous—and enormously 
damaging—consequences for how the Court approaches issues of democratic 
process. 
c.  Regime 3:  The Catch-All First Amendment 
The newest—and conceptually the narrowest—branch of democratic 
jurisprudence arises under the First Amendment.  The Court’s interest in the 
First Amendment as a tool to regulate electoral politics began routinely 
enough.  In a series of cases decided in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court 
confronted a variety of laws imposing direct and overt regulatory constraints 
on the content of political speech.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,175 for 
example, the Court invalidated a state libel law that imposed liability on 
private statements criticizing the performance of public officials so as to 
protect their reputations from critical public comment.176  The Court 
invalidated the law as applied to public officials on the ground that the First 
Amendment forbids state punishment of the “good-faith critic of 
government.”177  In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,178 the Court extended the 
reach of the New York Times rule to protect criticism of candidates for 
elective office, overturning a defamation award in favor of a candidate for 
U.S. Senate whose character had been impugned by allegations of long-ago 
criminal conduct.179 
In Mills v. Alabama,180 the Court struck down a state law prohibiting all 
“electioneering”—advocating the election or defeat of particular candidates 
or ballot propositions—on Election Day.181  In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC,182 the Court sustained against a First Amendment challenge a 
Federal Communications Commission rule requiring broadcast licensees to 
 
 172. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 173. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 174. Id. at 806. 
 175. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 176. See id. at 292. 
 177. Id. 
 178. 401 U.S. 265 (1971). 
 179. See id. at 277. 
 180. 384 U.S. 214 (1966). 
 181. See id. at 216, 220. 
 182. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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provide free equal time to representatives of viewpoints contrary to those 
presented by the broadcaster.183  In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo,184 the Court invalidated a similar right-of-reply law as applied to 
political attacks appearing in newspapers.185  All of these cases required the 
Court to adjudicate the constitutionality of measures that imposed direct 
regulatory restraints on what individuals were permitted to say in the course 
of routine political campaigning.  There is thus nothing in the slightest 
surprising or untoward in the Court’s resort to the First Amendment to 
resolve them; it is obviously an appropriate tool for the job. 
Things began to change, however, in 1976 when the Court handed down 
its seminal ruling in Buckley v. Valeo.186  There, the law under review did 
not regulate political speech but rather the giving and spending of money 
used to pay for political speech.187  In the Federal Election Campaign Act188 
(FECA), enacted in 1971 and significantly amended in 1974, Congress set 
ceilings on both monetary contributions to candidates for federal office and 
independent expenditures in support of such candidates.189  In a fateful 
decision, the Court chose to treat these restrictions as abridgments under the 
First Amendment of the individual freedoms of political speech and political 
association.190  Limitations on expenditures made to pay for political speech, 
the Court held, could not be justified by any sufficiently compelling 
government interest.191  In contrast, the Court ruled, caps on direct financial 
contributions to candidates could be sustained, notwithstanding their 
impingement on protected speech and associational interests, in virtue of the 
government interest in preventing corruption.192 
From here, the First Amendment juggernaut began to gather steam.  In its 
1983 decision in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court took the significant step 
of essentially firing the Equal Protection Clause as its main constitutional 
vehicle in cases alleging infringement of the right to vote.193  In its place, the 
Court substituted the First Amendment.  Anderson was a ballot access case; 
the plaintiff, an independent candidate in the 1980 presidential race, 
challenged Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates seeking 
to be listed on the ballot.194  In a long line of prior cases, the Court had 
adjudicated the constitutionality of state laws regulating access to the official 
ballot under the Regime 2 Equal Protection Clause analysis discussed 
 
 183. See id. at 387–88. 
 184. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 185. Id. at 258. 
 186. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 187. See id. at 15. 
 188. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 47, 
and 52 U.S.C.). 
 189. Buckley, 418 U.S. at 1–3, 17. 
 190. Id. at 17. 
 191. Id. at 51. 
 192. Id. at 35. 
 193. See 460 U.S. 780, 792–96 (1983). 
 194. Id. at 782–83. 
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above.195  In Anderson, however, the Court announced that it would 
thenceforth analyze ballot access restrictions under the First Amendment 
right of freedom of association, a second-order right derived by implication 
from the freedom of speech.196  The Court’s only explanation was buried in 
a three-sentence footnote: 
In this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and do not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause 
analysis.  We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior 
election cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  These cases, applying the “fundamental rights” strand of 
equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters and 
candidates, and have considered the degree to which the State’s restrictions 
further legitimate state interests.197 
Although a restriction on having one’s name printed on an election ballot 
is far from self-evidently a problem that cries out for treatment as a restriction 
on political speech or association, the Court nevertheless went on in 
Anderson to invalidate the restriction at issue on the ground that preventing 
qualified candidates from obtaining a place on the ballot burdened 
constitutionally protected association between candidates and their 
supporters.198 
If Anderson had applied only to ballot access cases, its impact might have 
been slight.  In fact, Anderson worked a much more significant and 
far-reaching doctrinal change:  it refounded the right to vote, in virtually all 
of its applications, from principles of equal treatment to principles of free 
speech and association.  The magnitude of the change became clear only a 
full decade later when the Court decided Burdick v. Takushi,199 a case raising 
a constitutional challenge to a state law prohibiting write-in voting.200  
Despite its rejection of the plaintiff’s free speech argument—that an election 
ballot should be understood as “a general forum for political 
expression”201—the Court nevertheless proceeded under the First 
Amendment, but on a wholly different theory. 
The Court began by addressing itself not to ballot access laws in particular, 
but to “election laws” in general, a category of laws that, the Court observed, 
“will invariably impose some burden on individual voters.”202  The Court 
went on to articulate a well-known and now dominant test requiring courts 
 
 195. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 717–19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 
(1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–35 (1968). 
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 199. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
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“considering a challenge to a state election law” to weigh the burden on a 
plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the government’s 
justifications and to apply either strict scrutiny or rational basis review 
depending on the outcome of that balancing.203  The result of the Court’s 
analysis in Anderson and Burdick is that all claims alleging infringement of 
a constitutionally grounded right to vote have been shifted presumptively 
from the Equal Protection Clause to the First Amendment and that the 
constitutionally relevant interests of plaintiffs are now redefined from 
interests in equal treatment to interests in speaking freely and associating.  As 
the Court said plainly in a 2010 case, Burdick “acknowledged the existence 
of a First Amendment interest in voting,”204 an interest that prior to 1983 had 
never been acknowledged. 
The reach of the Burdick reformulation is readily demonstrated by the 
great variety of problems to which it has since been applied.  The Supreme 
Court itself has applied Burdick’s First Amendment analysis to adjudicate 
the validity of laws regulating eligibility to vote in party primary elections,205 
the presentation of photo identification at the polls,206 and disclosure of the 
identity of initiative petition signers.207  Lower courts have dutifully applied 
Burdick to an even wider variety of problems regarding the availability and 
conditions of various voting procedures, including procedures for absentee 
voting,208 special elections,209 recall elections,210 and reruns of invalidated 
general elections;211 the qualifications of election officials, including petition 
circulators,212 registrars,213 and election inspectors;214 the technicalities of 
electoral management, including party nomination procedures,215 filing 
fees,216 the casting and counting of provisional ballots,217 early voting,218 
procedures for counting and verifying referendum petitions,219 official 
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practices of reporting vote totals,220 voter registration and party enrollment 
practices,221 vote-counting practices in recall elections,222 the content of 
nominating petitions,223 and designation of party labels on ballots;224 and 
even the imposition of term limits on candidates for elected office.225 
But the Burdick analysis is not the only vehicle the Court uses to subject 
democratic procedures to First Amendment review.  The Court continues, for 
example, to apply First Amendment speech analysis to direct restrictions on 
political speech.226  It applies First Amendment speech and associational 
analyses to restrictions on the giving and spending of campaign money.227  It 
invokes the First Amendment right of association to examine laws regulating 
the activities of political parties.228  It has relied on the First Amendment to 
adjudicate questions arising from laws requiring disclosure of information 
about those who speak229 or give money in the course of political 
campaigns.230  And it has relied on the First Amendment to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of laws regulating the activities of political actors such as 
initiative circulators.231  And although before Rucho the Court had 
consistently applied the Equal Protection Clause in cases raising claims of 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering,232 a total of six different justices 
in various cases asserted that such cases would be more tractable if handled 
under the First Amendment.233  Before the Court’s ruling in Rucho rendered 
them irrelevant, lower courts had already begun to turn to the First 
Amendment to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.234 
To be sure, the Court, for obvious and appropriate reasons, still adjudicates 
cases involving claims of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection 
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Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment (Regime 1),235 both of which provide 
specialized tools designed expressly for such controversies.  It also continues 
to use the equal protection–based right to vote (Regime 2) in certain narrow 
classes of vote dilution cases, such as cases involving apportionment, 
redistricting, and the one-person, one-vote doctrine.  But aside from these 
exceptions, it is fair to say that the Court now finds the First Amendment 
(Regime 3) so versatile and appealing a provision that it approaches its 
democracy cases as though the First Amendment is virtually the only 
provision in the entire Constitution relevant to the system of representative 
democracy it institutionalizes.  The First Amendment has become for the 
Court essentially a one-provision constitution, complete in itself, capable of 
solving nearly every problem of democracy for which judicial review may 
be had. 
2.  The Scholarly Critique 
As this movement in the Court’s jurisprudence picked up steam, scholars 
began to criticize it.  Here is where the critique of “incoherence” began to 
have some bite, although it was made in several different ways.  Some 
scholars, for example, charged the Court with incoherence on an ad hoc basis 
as a way of arguing that the Court’s election law jurisprudence had begun to 
produce results that in particular cases or domains were so unpredictable or 
unexpected as to seem essentially random.236  Others, however, leveled the 
charge of incoherence in a broader and more systematic way by arguing that 
the incoherence of the jurisprudence was a direct consequence of the Court’s 
methodological choice to decide election law issues almost entirely using the 
vehicle of individual rights.237  The origins of this “structuralist” critique238 
are often traced to an influential 1998 article by Professors Sam Issacharoff 
and Rick Pildes in which they argued that a jurisprudence based in rights was 
“too narrow to capture the range of considerations” inherent in the 
adjudication of issues relating to democratic practice.239  The Court’s 
insistence on adjudicating such questions solely through resort to individual 
rights, they claimed, led to a series of “awkward attempts to fold difficult 
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questions of democratic politics and judicial review into the conventional 
regime of rights-based constitutional and statutory law.”240  That is to say, 
the Court’s approach to a set of critically important constitutional problems 
was impeded by its “failure to use the proper normative tools.”241  As a result, 
“the Court’s electoral jurisprudence lacks any underlying vision of 
democratic politics that is normatively robust or realistically sophisticated 
about actual political practices.”242  In the absence of such an underlying 
theory or vision of appropriate democratic practice, solidly grounded in 
constitutional principles, incoherence is said to be the predictable outcome. 
In what ways did the Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice seem 
incoherent?  For example, as indicated in Part I, the Court took inconsistent 
approaches to regulation of political contributions and expenditures, 
essentially rewriting the Federal Election Campaign Act, a coherent piece of 
legislation as enacted, into self-contradiction.243  Or, the Court, seemingly 
inexplicably, rejected the innovation of the blanket primary.244  It startlingly 
overturned long-standing, widely valued limitations on how candidates may 
campaign for elective judgeships,245 and any form whatsoever of limitation 
on campaign spending, no matter how benignly motivated.246 
A persistent signal of the growing incoherence of the Court’s fully 
rights-based jurisprudence is that seemingly easy cases suddenly posed great 
jurisprudential difficulty.  A particularly vivid example of this phenomenon, 
from among many candidates, is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lindsay v. 
Bowen.247  Article II of the U.S. Constitution requires the president of the 
United States to be at least 35 years of age.248  In Lindsay, a 27-year-old who 
wished to run for president argued that her exclusion from the California 
presidential ballot on the ground of age ineligibility violated her First 
Amendment rights and those of her party and its supporters.  On any 
reasonable view of the matter, this case is resolved completely and decisively 
by the plain language of a foundational structural provision of the 
Constitution:  Article II.  It is hard to understand why any court would even 
bother to conduct an analysis of such a claim or write a full opinion.  
Nevertheless, applying what it viewed, not illogically, as binding Supreme 
Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit turned immediately to the First 
Amendment claim to analyze the degree to which the constitutional age 
requirement “burden[s] . . . Lindsay’s speech and association rights.”249  To 
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its credit, I suppose, the court found the burden “minimal”250 and thus upheld 
the exclusion, although a better result surely would have been to find the 
“burden” on the plaintiff’s “rights” exactly zero on the ground that a 
structural provision of the Constitution provides a definitive and fully 
binding answer to the question posed. 
Another easy case that became unnecessarily difficult when handled under 
a narrow regime of First Amendment rights is Burson v. Freeman,251 in 
which the Supreme Court upheld a state law prohibiting electioneering within 
one hundred feet of polling places.252  It is hard to imagine any measure more 
innocuous than one that requires active campaigning for office to be left 
outside the polling place itself.  Such laws provide voters, at an appropriate 
moment immediately before casting their ballots, with a brief period of 
mental repose in which they can compose their thoughts, concentrate on the 
task at hand, and decide how to discharge the weighty civic duty of voting.253 
At the same time, such laws leave political actors free to campaign in every 
other place, at every other time, so any loss of opportunity to campaign 
within, or in the immediate vicinity of, the polling place on Election Day is 
utterly trivial.  Indeed, common sense suggests strongly that the only reason 
candidates or their supporters would even seek the opportunity to appeal to 
voters as they enter the polling place or while they vote is not to engage them 
in a meaningful exchange on the merits of a candidacy but transparently to 
exploit the possibility that some voters might be influenced to vote for the 
candidate whose name they have most recently seen or heard,254 an interest 
entitled to precisely zero weight in any system that aspires to thoughtful 
democratic self-rule.  Other jurisdictions that no one would consider unfree 
place considerably greater restrictions on campaigning—New Zealand, for 
example, prohibits all campaigning on election day, and Spain designates the 
day before an election an official “day of reflection” on which all 
campaigning is banned255—so the deprivation worked by American 
electioneering laws again is trivial by comparison. 
Nevertheless, the Court found this a difficult case.  Because the Court was 
committed to adjudicating the case under the First Amendment, the facts 
provided immediate trouble.  Electioneering laws not only prohibit speech, 
but do so in a content-based manner—only campaign speech is prohibited—
so the Court found itself compelled by its First Amendment precedents to 
apply strict scrutiny.256  This framework immediately and inappropriately put 
a strong thumb on the scale in favor of invalidation,257 and the majority had 
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to work far harder than necessary to find a way to uphold the law.  In the end, 
three justices voted to strike down the law on the ground that it engaged in 
“censorship of election-day campaigning,”258 which is exactly what the law 
does—a fact that, under any other regime of constitutional analysis, would 
count as a mark in its favor. 
C.  Reconsolidation:  The Path to Illiberalism 
Like any weed, authoritarianism thrives in disorderly conditions.259  
Consequently, one of the first tasks of populist opponents of an established 
liberal democratic order is to deconsolidate it, sowing the kind of 
confusion—and associated anxiety—that enhances the appeal of the 
simplistic, seemingly orderly, but typically illiberal, prescriptions offered by 
populism.260  Once an unpleasant sense of chaos and disorder has been 
established, illiberal actors can much more easily introduce illiberal 
measures.261 
This is roughly the path pursued by the Supreme Court in its constitutional 
jurisprudence of democratic practice.  If, as I have argued, the Court 
gradually deconsolidated its constitutional jurisprudence of democratic 
practice into incoherence, its more recent decisions suggest that the Court has 
entered a new phase:  reconsolidation of a now-wrecked, liberal democratic 
jurisprudence into an overtly illiberal one.  The Court’s strategy in this phase 
appears to have two prongs:  First, it has drastically narrowed the class of 
democratic issues that it construes the Constitution to address, exiling to 
constitutional oblivion a wide variety of potential claims relevant to the 
practice of democracy, and remanding to politics abuses that politics is 
unlikely to correct because it is politics that has generated them.  Second, 
where the Court does construe constitutional rights to address claims 
regarding democratic practice, it has been highly selective concerning the 
vigor with which it construes the Constitution to protect the right in question.  
In some cases, the Court has pushed its increasingly narrow conception of 
constitutionally protected principles with extraordinary force.  In other cases, 
however, it has taken a remarkably casual approach, finding unobjectionable 
invasions even of the narrow individual rights it still acknowledges to enjoy 
constitutional protection.  On the whole, these parallel approaches have 
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produced outcomes that can only be characterized as illiberal and 
anti-democratic. 
1.  Jurisprudential Exile:  Narrowing the Field of Relevant Considerations 
One of the Court’s principal strategies has been to exclude from judicial 
consideration—and thus from the purview of the Constitution—an 
ever-greater variety of claims and considerations.  Here, I mention four:  (1) 
an extremely broad and powerful “gag rule” that drastically narrows the 
vocabulary, and thus the stock of concepts, that litigants may invoke; (2) an 
informal cap on the number and kinds of rights that the Constitution will be 
construed to recognize; (3) expansion of the political question doctrine to 
exclude judicial consideration of challenges to practices that are agreed to be 
obnoxious to democratic self-rule; and (4) a conception of litigant standing 
so narrow as to preclude judicial consideration of a growing number of 
increasingly urgent claims about democratic practice. 
a.  The Gag Rule 
By far the most significant effect of the Court’s turn to individual rights 
has been the severe narrowing of constitutional discourse that it has 
produced.  It is true, of course, that the Equal Protection Clause and the First 
Amendment offer litigants a vocabulary and stock of concepts in which to 
express their claims.  Just as important, however, is the vocabulary litigants 
are now denied.  In the absence of availability of any considerations of 
democratic structure or constitutional telos, litigants challenging manifestly 
undemocratic practices may not raise an issue of constitutional dimension by 
arguing, for example, that a law is “undemocratic.”  They may not argue that 
a regulatory measure “deprives me of representation,” or that it “impairs the 
democratic accountability of government,” or that it undermines “popular 
sovereignty,” or that it makes the government “insufficiently responsive” to 
the popular will, or that it gives “disproportionate political influence” to a 
group or to individuals.  All of these are prominent and indeed constitutive 
principles of democracy, however it is conceived,262 yet the Court’s 
jurisprudence of individual rights completely excludes these concepts from 
judicial consideration; they play literally no role whatsoever in its analysis or 
decision-making.  The Court’s conceptual vocabulary thus excludes from the 
constitutional analysis the very terms and concepts to which people routinely 
turn when talking about democracy, and which indeed, on any reasonable 
view of the matter, are inseparable from a meaningful understanding of what 
democracy is and how it operates.263  Indeed, in cases that do not involve 
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racial discrimination, about all that litigants are now entitled to assert is that 
some rule or practice impairs their speech or association—by no means a 
natural or even sensible way to describe many highly significant democratic 
insults. 
Moreover, by choosing to rely almost exclusively in democracy cases on 
the First Amendment, the Court—several of whose members believe they are 
compelled to interpret the Constitution by resort to the intentions of the 
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution—has cut itself off from an 
enormously rich body of founding-era political opinion and evidence.  The 
First Amendment is notorious not only for the paucity of its legislative 
history but also for the acknowledged irrelevance to contemporary problems 
of such legislative history as exists.264  Thus, the present jurisprudence 
disables litigants not only from arguing on the merits that some particular 
government action is anti-democratic but also that the Framers would so have 
conceived it. 
b.  The Rights That Don’t Exist 
If a court is going to found a constitutional jurisprudence of democracy 
exclusively on individual rights, it is surely necessary that the available rights 
be sufficient in scope and variety to reach the wide variety of abuses of 
democratic practice that corrupt, self-interested, or single-minded partisan 
officials might deploy.  Yet a remarkable feature of the rights approach is 
that the number and scope of constitutionally protected democratic rights 
recognized by the Court is unusually narrow and not at all adequate to the 
substantial managerial task. 
The problems begin with the single most important right in a democratic 
republic:  the right to vote itself.  Although the Court has recognized such a 
right, it has not construed it robustly—that is, the Court has not actually found 
the right to vote to be affirmatively granted by any provision of the 
Constitution.  Instead, as related above, the Court has found it to exist only 
indirectly, in two ways.  First, the Equal Protection Clause indirectly contains 
a watered-down, relativistic right to vote.265  This right does not acknowledge 
in any particular class of individuals an actual, affirmative right to cast a 
ballot in any particular election; instead, it requires only that such 
opportunities to vote as governments might in their beneficence choose to 
provide be distributed in a way that is free of prohibited discrimination.266  
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Second, the right exists indirectly under the First Amendment as something 
that governments may not excessively burden,267 but which has no 
constitutional force or presence independent of the speech and associational 
interests with which it is indirectly associated.  The First Amendment right 
to vote is thus, in essence, a collection of electrons missing a nucleus. 
Similarly, there is no right to run for office.268  In a democratic republic 
committed to the election of representatives, there must be candidates.  States 
understand this well:  state law heavily regulates the conditions under which 
those interested in public service may stand for elective office.269  When 
these laws preclude, or place large obstacles in the path of, the candidacy of 
those who wish to run for elective office, we might expect a commitment to 
an individual rights approach to produce a constitutionally grounded right to 
run for office.  Yet the Court has consistently refused to admit the existence 
of such a right.  Instead, the Court has adjudicated challenges to restrictions 
on candidacy indirectly, by treating laws restricting candidacy as though they 
were laws restricting the right to vote.270  Indeed, the Court’s approach 
substitutes for one nonexistent right—the right to run for office—a different 
right—the right to vote—which also lacks direct constitutional grounding. 
Similarly, in many cases, the Court has been at pains to point out that the 
Constitution does not contain a right to proportional representation.271  What 
the Court neglects to mention is that the Constitution, as construed by the 
Court, does not contain a right even to disproportional representation because 
the Court has not construed the Constitution to confer a right to any kind of 
representation at all.272  It is intrinsic to the idea of representative democracy 
that a democratically elected government ought to be accountable and 
responsive to the popular will,273 but there is no individual or group right to 
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accountability or responsiveness.  In the same vein, there is no right to 
register to vote; no right to organize an officially recognized political party; 
no right of individuals or parties to get their names printed on the ballot; no 
right to a majoritarian political process; no right to a convenient and 
accessible polling place, nor any right to enter whatever polling place the 
state may provide; nor any right to a secret ballot, nor to a secure one.  In a 
jurisprudence in which the Court insists that all constitutional management 
of democratic practice occur through the adjudication of rights claims, the 
absence of these rights renders the practice of meaningful democratic 
self-rule startlingly precarious. 
c.  The Claims That Don’t Exist 
If the Court has narrowed the range of judicially cognizable considerations 
by capping the number of recognized democratic constitutional rights, it has 
also done so lately by narrowing the kinds of claims that will be deemed 
judicially cognizable.  By far the most notable example of this is the Court’s 
2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause.274  Americans are polarized on 
many issues, but on the question of partisan gerrymandering they 
overwhelmingly agree:  according to a recent survey, 71 percent of 
Americans “want the Supreme Court to place limits on lawmakers’ ability to 
manipulate voting maps.”275  In a sharp reversal of four decades of 
constitutional jurisprudence, the Court in Rucho held that constitutional 
challenges to partisan gerrymandering by state legislatures raised questions 
so unsuited for judicial review that they must be deemed fundamentally 
political rather than judicial.276  As a result, the Court held judicial 
consideration of partisan gerrymandering claims to lie outside the 
jurisdiction of federal courts.277 
d.  No One Has Standing 
Finally, even when the Court concedes that abuses of democratic norms 
and practices raise cognizable constitutional claims, the Court increasingly 
has narrowed the circumstances in which plaintiffs may pursue them by 
aggressively deploying the Article III jurisdictional requirement of litigant 
standing.278  The Court began to deploy Article III to choke off access to the 
Constitution in democracy cases in United States v. Hays.279  There, it held 
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that only people residing physically within a racially gerrymandered district 
have standing to challenge it, notwithstanding the impact of racial 
gerrymandering in one district on voters residing within other districts.280  In 
another redistricting case, the Court held that voters lacked standing to 
challenge a state legislature’s mid-decade redrawing of district lines for 
partisan advantage.281  In another, the Court held that a chamber of a state 
legislature lacked standing to defend its own districting plan against charges 
of racial gerrymandering,282 and in another, the Court could not find a proper 
plaintiff to raise a constitutional claim of partisan gerrymandering.283 
But many of the standing cases have had nothing to do with redistricting.  
Thus, for example, the sponsors of a state ballot initiative lacked standing to 
defend its constitutionality even when state officials refused to do so.284  A 
candidate for elective judicial office lacked standing to challenge a state law 
requiring him to be a member of a political party.285  No one had standing to 
challenge a policy decision by the Trump administration to exclude from the 
decennial census count unlawful immigrants residing in the United States, a 
practice very plausibly alleged to be blatantly unconstitutional.286 
Now, it is certainly possible that some of these lawsuits are not the kind 
on which federal courts should expend their limited resources, but this is by 
no means true of all the cases that federal courts are now dismissing on 
standing grounds.287  Moreover, a different way to deter unwanted litigation 
over democratic procedures would be to develop and apply a robustly 
democratic jurisprudence that makes clear that anti-democratic laws and 
practices will not be tolerated under the U.S. Constitution. 
2.  Selective Vigor in Deploying Recognized Rights 
In addition to narrowing drastically the range of claims about democratic 
practice that it deems the Constitution to address and of which federal courts 
may take cognizance, where the Court still acknowledges a role for the 
Constitution, it has exercised great selectivity in determining the degree of 
constitutional protection for interests acknowledged to be of constitutional 
dimension.  In some domains, the Court has pressed narrow rights 
single-mindedly, and with extraordinary force, to provide highly robust 
protection to an exceedingly narrow set of interests.  In other domains, it has 
taken a remarkably ho-hum approach, setting levels of constitutional 
protection at surprisingly low levels. 
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By far the most extreme example of the Court pressing narrow rights with 
great force—and likely the most consequential—is in the domain of 
campaign finance.  There, the Court has applied First Amendment rights of 
speech and association (Regime 3) with great vigor, but in a single direction 
and against a single target:  it has one by one invalidated virtually every 
conceivable limitation on the ability of political actors to spend money in 
pursuit of their political objectives.  As explained earlier, this line of cases 
derives from Buckley v. Valeo, in which the Court invalidated regulatory 
limits on campaign expenditures by individuals and candidates as violations 
of their rights of speech and association.288  Within the last decade, however, 
the Court has pursued this agenda with unusual energy.  In 2010, in Citizens 
United v. FEC, the Court invalidated a century-old prohibition on corporate 
political spending from general treasury funds.289  In so holding, the Court 
found the interests of corporations in speaking out on political subjects and 
holding government officials accountable to be heavily burdened by such 
restrictions, notwithstanding that corporations cannot vote, have no political 
personality, are more than adequately represented in the political arena by 
their officers and employees participating in an individual capacity, and had 
long been permitted to raise money, and spend it without limit in the political 
arena, through affiliated political action committees.290  In so doing, the 
Court expressly overruled an earlier case, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,291 because a majority in that case had the effrontery to 
acknowledge that “immense aggregations of wealth” may have “corrosive 
and distorting effects” on democratic processes and outcomes.292 
The following year, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett,293 the 
Court invalidated a system of public financing for state elections in which 
candidates facing rich, self-financed opponents were eligible to receive 
additional public funds to level the playing field.294  Even though, after 
Buckley, rich, self-financed candidates are free to spend their own money on 
their own campaigns without limit,295 and the provision at issue was 
triggered only when candidates competing for the same office were badly 
mismatched in terms of resources, the Court construed this provision to 
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impose “an unprecedented” burden on the speech rights of rich candidates.296  
The Court thus seemed to take the position that the rich have the right not 
only to speak without limitation, but to speak without fear of effective 
contradiction by the poor. 
Three years later, in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Court invalidated an overall 
spending cap of more than $123,000 on contributions to multiple candidates 
for federal office.297  Despite reaffirming the authority of governments to 
limit contributions to individual candidates because of their potential to 
corrupt, the Court found a prohibition on making the maximum contribution 
to an unlimited number of candidates to be “not a ‘modest restraint’ at all.”298  
Thus, the First Amendment right of rich contributors to support not only 
candidates who compete to represent them directly, but who compete to 
represent others with whom the donor shares no political community, nor 
even any political relationship, cannot be abridged.  If, in the 1960s, the Court 
was able to determine that legislators do not “represent . . . trees or acres 
[or] . . . farms or cities,”299 over the ensuing half-century it evidently figured 
out what legislators do represent:  dollars. 
At the same time, where speech and money are not directly at stake, the 
Court has frequently construed the constitutionally grounded right to vote to 
offer little protection against government interference.  In Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board,300 for example, the Court upheld an Indiana 
law requiring presentation of photo identification as a condition for voting.301  
Indiana justified the law, among the most restrictive in the nation, as 
necessary to prevent voter impersonation at the polls, even though not a 
single incident of such fraud had ever been recorded in the state’s entire 
history.302  The law required eligible voters who lacked one of a limited 
number of permitted forms of identification to obtain satisfactory ID from a 
state motor vehicle office,303 even though such offices were widely scattered 
in many parts of the state and suitable public transportation was either 
nonexistent or extremely inconvenient.304  Obtaining suitable ID also in 
many cases required a financial outlay that eligible but indigent voters might 
not be able to afford.305  In balancing the interests on both sides, the Court 
found the burden on voters insufficient to outweigh a state justification that 
was at best speculative, and at worst entirely fraudulent.306 
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Similarly, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court invalidated section 4 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the ground that the risk of racial 
discrimination in voting by states subject to the VRA no longer justified the 
VRA’s strict preclearance provisions.307  Within hours of the ruling, covered 
states proved the Court wrong by rolling out a wide variety of vote 
suppression measures.308  States continued to use their newfound freedom 
from federal oversight to enact measures harmful to the political participation 
of Black voters, all the way through the most recent election.309 
As noted above, during the period when the Court was handing down these 
decisions, scholars interpreted what they were seeing as jurisprudential 
incoherence, and understandably so.310  In retrospect, however, it is now 
clear that the problem with these rulings is not that they are incoherent; it is 
that they are illiberal.  They deny the fundamental political equality of 
citizens; they deny that the majority presumptively should rule; they 
repudiate principles of fair and equal representation developed by the Court 
in its earlier cases; they undermine the possibility of holding officials 
meaningfully accountable for their actions; and although they acknowledge 
rights associated with successful democracy, such as rights of free speech 
and political association, they fail to acknowledge and protect the core 
interests that these peripheral rights are meant to serve:  democratic self-rule 
by the American polity, in all its messy, pluralistic diversity. 
CONCLUSION 
In what is surely one of the greatest ironies of American constitutional law, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has for a generation or more slowly illiberalized the 
constitutional jurisprudence of democracy through the exceedingly 
aggressive deployment of one of the signature devices of liberalism itself:  a 
constitutional right.  Long ago, when I was a law student, one often heard it 
said that law school “sharpens” students by “narrowing” them, a charge 
meant to imply a warping of the soul.  Much the same may be said of the 
Court’s jurisprudence of democratic practice.  By continually narrowing the 
scope of considerations deemed relevant to the constitutionalization of 
democracy, it has warped the soul of a republican constitution, transforming 
it into exactly what it is not and was never meant to be:  a deeply illiberal 
document that empowers the powerful and subordinates the weak. 
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APPENDIX 
Provisions of the U.S. Constitution Relating to Democratic Practice 
 
1. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1:  The House of Representatives shall be composed 
of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, 
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for 
Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. 
 
2. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2:  No Person shall be a Representative who shall not 
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen 
of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen. 
 
3. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3:  Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole 
Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of 
Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The 
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting 
of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of 
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of 
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each 
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall 
be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, 
Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, 
Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, 
Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South 
Carolina five, and Georgia three. 
 
4. Art. I, § 2, cl. 4:  When vacancies happen in the Representation from 
any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill 
such Vacancies. 
 
5. Art. I, § 4, cl. 1:  The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter 
such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. 
 
6. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1:  Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . 
 
7. Art. I, § 9, cl. 8:  No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United 
States . . . 
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8. Art. II, § 1, cl. 1:  [T]ogether with the Vice President, chosen for the 
same Term, [the President shall] be elected, as follows . . . 
 
9. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2:  Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled 
in the Congress:  but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an 
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an 
Elector. 
 
10. Art. II, § 1, cl. 3:  The electors shall meet in their respective States, 
and vote by ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an 
Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of 
all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government 
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of 
the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person 
having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number 
be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be 
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, 
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of 
them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five 
highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. 
But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the 
Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose 
shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States, and a 
Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after 
the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes 
of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or 
more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the 
Vice-President. 
 
11. Art. II, § 1, cl. 4:  The Congress may determine the Time of chusing 
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day 
shall be the same throughout the United States. 
 
12. Art. IV, § 4:  The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government . . . 
 
13. Amend. I:  Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
 
14. Amend. XII:  The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and 
vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall 
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not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the 
person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, 
and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, 
and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, 
directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in 
the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the 
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number 
be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person 
have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not 
exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of 
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President.  But in 
choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a 
member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives 
shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President 
shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional 
disability of the President.  The person having the greatest number of votes 
as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority 
of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, 
then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the 
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the 
whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be 
necessary to a choice.  But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office 
of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. 
 
15. Amend. XIV: 
1:  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2:  Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
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reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear 
to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
5: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
 
16. Amend. XV: 
1:  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
2:  The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
 
17. Amend. XVII:  The Senate of the United States shall be composed 
of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; 
and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have 
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State legislatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, 
the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such 
vacancies:  Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the 
executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the 
vacancies by election as the legislature may direct. 
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term 
of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution. 
 
18. Amend. XIX:  The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex. 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
 
19. Amend. XXIII: 
1:  The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States 
shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of 
electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of 
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be 
entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; 
they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be 
considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, 
to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and 
perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. 
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20. Amend. XXIV: 
1:  The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other 
election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice 
President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any 
poll tax or other tax. 
2:  The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
 
21. Amend. XXVI: 
1:  The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any 
state on account of age. 
2:  The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
 
